Russian disinformation operations against Ukraine during the large-scale invasion: a case study

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.28925/2311-259x.2025.3.10

Keywords:

disinformation, information operation, media, Ukraine, russia, social media

Abstract

The relevance of the study lies in the growing attention to state disinformation, which can lead to tangible consequences in real life, in particular, inciting war crimes or involvement in unprovoked military actions. A significant portion of academic research has focused on analyzing individual Russian disinformation narratives and their dissemination both within Ukraine and beyond. At the same time, the number of studies attempting to classify and assess the full spectrum of Russian tactics, techniques, and the dynamics of their evolution since the onset of the full-scale aggression remains limited.

The object of study in this article is three theoretically unrelated cases that illustrate emerging approaches in information influence operations: Website mirroring for disseminating alarming or negative content through advertisements and replies to posts; Distribution of falsified video content via video-sharing platforms, followed by amplification on social media; Mass duplication of disinformation content in comments across social networks. The purpose of this study is to describe the latest iterations of Russian campaigns in the post-invasion period, in particular to demonstrate their ability to adapt to restrictions related to sanctions and blockades. The research employs a multidisciplinary approach that combines digital humanities methods, narrative analysis, case study methodology, and open-source intelligence (OSINT). This approach enables tracing potential links between operations and highlights the evolution of tactics. The source base includes social media publications, websites, and reports from private companies. 

The findings indicate that the Russian disinformation ecosystem is adapting to new technological environments and constraints, while maintaining a core set of tactics rooted in Soviet-era practices. The findings are of practical importance for researchers and digital resilience professionals in developing more effective countermeasures against new information campaigns and in strengthening democratic societies’ capacity to withstand such threats.

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Author Biography

Roman Osadchuk, National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy

Postgraduate student of the Mohyla School of Journalism

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Published

31.10.2025

How to Cite

Osadchuk, R. (2025). Russian disinformation operations against Ukraine during the large-scale invasion: a case study. Synopsis: Text, Context, Media, 31(3), 215–222. https://doi.org/10.28925/2311-259x.2025.3.10

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Section

Media and virtual reality